Our Finance Industry Has a Replicant Problem
AML activities don't get to pick a side in the Telegram-France contest
When governments decide to take aim at platforms like Telegram, my mind drifts to Harrison Ford in Blade Runner: "Replicants are like any other machine—they're either a benefit or a hazard. If they're a benefit, it's not my problem."
It's a line that speaks to the tension between utility and danger, between what’s merely useful and what becomes impossible to ignore. For a long time, Telegram was the former—spectacularly useful until it wasn’t. But now, the French government has made it impossible to forget, branding it more hazard than benefit.
A Cybercrime Unit with Big Ambitions
Last month, France’s J3 cybercrime unit—a scrappy five-person team with limited resources—managed to arrest Telegram CEO Pavel Durov on charges of complicity in money laundering and child pornography. This small, specialized team helped orchestrate a massive, internationally coordinated effort to prosecute the case. The story reads like a modern-day David and Goliath, with a relatively small but highly specialized unit taking down the leader of a platform used by hundreds of millions around the world.
But there’s a paradox here that speaks volumes about our digital age. Telegram is a platform that hosts some of the most significant conversations in the world, yet it remains largely unknown to the general public. Most people have never heard of it, let alone understand how it works. Hidden in plain sight, it evokes a kind of unease, much like the term "dark web" has become shorthand for anything illegal or mysterious online. The truth is more complicated—and perhaps more troubling.
The Janus Face of Telegram
Telegram, like a robot in a dystopian sci-fi, has the potential for both incredible good and profound harm. On one hand, it is a lifeline for dissidents in repressive regimes like Iran and Belarus, a tool for free speech and organizing against autocratic power. On the other hand, it has become a breeding ground for some of the worst criminal behavior imaginable—from child exploitation to terrorist communication. This dichotomy raises the question: Should Telegram be held responsible for curbing illegal activities? Or is it simply providing the hammer, indifferent to what its users build—or break—with it?
It’s a debate that cuts to the core of platform ethics and responsibility. Telegram is the digital version of a knife—it can be used to carve a masterpiece or commit a crime. And while it’s easy to point fingers at platforms that allow for this kind of dual usage, the truth is, anyone interested in gathering intelligence has to be present. They have to drop anchor where the fish are, or risk missing out on critical insights.
The Challenge for AML and KYC Leaders
For Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Know Your Customer (KYC) leaders, the question isn't whether to engage—it’s how to do so ethically and effectively. Platforms like Telegram, for all their ambiguity, are where the big conversations and, consequently, the big risks are happening. It’s a place where the gray areas dominate, where compliance and intelligence teams often find themselves lost in a sea of ethical dilemmas and technical limitations.
Yet, most financial institutions struggle to ethically navigate these depths at scale. They face similar challenges with Discord, other social media platforms, and the ever-growing multitude of encrypted messaging services worldwide. The sheer volume of valuable intelligence being generated in these spaces is staggering, and it grows exponentially each year.
Despite the urgency, very few institutions have managed to systematize methods for responsibly accessing and continuously monitoring these otherwise inaccessible spaces for unfiltered insights. Fewer still know what to do with any information they acquire. The J3 unit, however, managed to do what many bigger, better-funded organizations have not. They took the fight into Telegram's shadows and emerged victorious.
Find Lessons from the Shadows
The success of J3 raises an important question: If a small, underfunded cybercrime unit can navigate these waters, why can't large financial institutions with vast resources do the same? The problem isn’t merely one of capability—it's a question of will and strategy. Navigating platforms like Telegram is challenging, yes, but it’s becoming increasingly clear that avoiding these platforms entirely is no longer an option. The stakes are simply too high.
For finance leaders, the choice is stark: adapt or face potentially catastrophic consequences. The difference between a productive day and billions in fines may come down to whether they can see these digital spaces for what they are—both benefit and hazard. It’s time to stop asking if platforms like Telegram should be monitored and start figuring out how to do it better.
Today’s intelligence landscape is shaped by the need to dive into the murky, unregulated waters of encrypted communication platforms. Only those willing to engage in the shadows—armed with the right tools, strategies, and ethical frameworks—will be able to illuminate the truth.
As we’ve seen with J3, even the smallest of teams can cast a very long shadow. The future belongs to those who know how to navigate it.
(References: Reuters, "Behind the arrest of Telegram boss: A small Paris cybercrime unit with big ambitions" [2024]; AML Intelligence, "Weekend Read: Behind the arrest of Telegram boss - a small Paris cybercrime unit with big ambitions" [2024].)